The italicized portions of subsections (c), (d) and (e) of the statute include "restraint" and "monopoly" language, some of which resembles language contained in Clayton Act provisions. 4 By contrast, subsections (a) and (b) appear to be tort-like provisions that are concerned with unfair practices and discrimination, but not with restraint of trade or monopoly as such. They do not contain an explicit requirement of competitive harm or threat of monopoly.
While subsections (c), (d), and (e) use antitrust-like language they may in fact reach somewhat further than the antitrust laws. First, their scope is not limited to 3 7 U.S.C. §192 (emphasis added). 4 Sections 2, 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act all contain provisions limiting their coverage to situations where the effect of the stated practice "may be" substantially to "lessen competition" or "tend to create a monopoly." Section 2 was subsequently broadened by the Robinson-Patman Act to reach specific injures to disfavored purchasers. See 14 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ ¶2331-2340 (2d ed. 2005).
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Finally, the PSA includes a private action provision that enables private plaintiffs injured by a violation to recover "the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of such violation." 10 The private action provision also states that its remedies are in addition to any other common law or statutory remedies, which presumably include both federal and state antitrust laws. 11 However, by its terms the PSA allows only single, not trebled, damages. As a matter of simple statutory construction it seems quite clear that subsections (a) and (b) are simple tort-like provision, not monopoly or antitrust-like provisions, because they do not contain the "restraining commerce" or "creating a monopoly"
language that sub-sections (c), (d) and (e) The chief evil feared is the monopoly of the packers, enabling them unduly and arbitrarily to lower prices to the shipper, who sells, and unduly and arbitrarily to increase the price to the consumer, who buys. Congress thought that the power to maintain this monopoly was aided by control of the stockyards. Another evil, which it sought to provide against by the act, was exorbitant charges, duplication of commissions, deceptive practices in respect of prices, in the passage of the live stock through the stockyards, all made possible by collusion between the stockyards management and the commission was no claim that Tyson was a monopolist. The Sixth Circuit dismissed the complaint men, on the one hand, and the packers and dealers, on the other. Expenses incurred in the passage through the stockyards necessarily reduce the price received by the shipper, and increase the price to be paid by the consumer. If they be exorbitant or unreasonable, they are an undue burden on the commerce which the stockyards are intended to facilitate. Any unjust or deceptive practice or combination that unduly and directly enhances them is an unjust obstruction to that commerce. The shipper, whose live stock are being cared for and sold in the stockyards market, is ordinarily not present at the sale, but is far away in the West. He is wholly dependent on the commission men. Justice Taft concluded that the PSA "treats the various stockyards of the country as great national public utilities to promote the flow of commerce from the ranges and farms of the West to the consumers in the East." Id. at 516. In accordance with Stafford and the legislative history, courts have understood that the PSA was intended to combat unfair and deceptive trade practices and other evils in addition to monopolization. See Spencer Livestock Comm 'n Co. v. USDA, 841 F.2d 1451 , 1455 (9th Cir. 1988 ) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85-1048 and noting that the PSA "was not intended merely to prevent monopolistic practices, but also to protect the livestock market from unfair and deceptive business tactics"); Van Wyk v. Bergland, 570 F.2d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1978 ) ("One purpose of the Act is 'to assure fair trade practices ....") (quoting Bruhn's Freezer Meats v. USDA, 438 F.2d 1332 , 1337 (8th Cir. 1971 );United States v. Donahue Bros., 59 F.2d 1019, 1023 (8th Cir. 1932) ("One of the purposes of this act was to protect the owner and shipper of live stock, and to free him from the fear that the channel through which his product passed, through discrimination, exploitation, overreaching, manipulation, or other unfair practices, might not return to him a fair return for his product."). In keeping with these broader purposes of the PSA, this Court has found that conduct with no apparent effect on competition can violate various provisions of the PSA. See Parchman v. USDA, 852 P.2d 858, 864 (6th Cir. 1988 Inc. v. Glickman, 187 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir.1999 ) (unilateral conduct, defendant allegedly entered into marketing agreements between processor and feedlots violated the PSA, court held the agreement did not violate the act) ; Philson v. Goldsboro Milling Co., Nos. 96-2542 , 96-2631 , 164 F.3d 625, 1998 WL 709324 (4th Cir. Oct.5, 1998 ) ( unilateral conduct, plaintiffs complained of defendants weighing procedures who then allegedly terminated the contracts with plaintiffs in retaliation, court held that lower courts evidentiary findings and jury instructions concerning their PSA claims affirmed); Jackson v. Swift Eckrich, Inc., 53 F.3d 1452 , 1458 (8th Cir.1995 ) (unilateral conduct, plaintiffs complained that defendants turkey handling practices violated the PSA, court upheld jury finidng/awarded damages of violations of the PSA by defendant); Farrow v. United States Dep't of Agric.,760 F.2d 211, 215 (8th Cir.1985) (concerted action by defendants, officer of Department of Agriculture filed an administrative complaint against two dealers who agreed not to compete against each other, court upheld cease and desist order concerning this conduct ); DeJong Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329 , 1336 -37 (9th Cir.1980 , cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980) (concerted conduct, Packers and Stockyard Administration alleged that defendants had conspired to force auction stockyards to change their sale terms to place more risk on the seller rather than the packer, court affirmed violation and findings of the administration); Pac. Trading Co. v. Wilson & Co., 547 F.2d 367, 369-70 (7th Cir.1976 ) (unilateral and concerted conduct, plaintiffs complained that defendants sold them bad hams thus violating their contracts and the PSA; plaintiffs did not state a claim as the business practices did not adversely affect competition).
